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11
is diametrical to this view, especially to
Catholic priests who are sworn to the
"seal of confession." Condemnation of
such oppression was espoused by a great
45
opponent of privileges, Jeremy Bentham:
In the character, of penitents, the people
would be pressed with the whole weight
of the penal branch of the law; inhibited
from the exercise of this essential and indispensable article of their religion ...
The advantage gained by the coercion-

gained in the shape of assistance to justice
45

8

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §

2285 (rev. ed. 1961).

Defendant Compelled
to Testify as a
Medical Expert
Plaintiff sued a hospital and several doctors for malpractice. While attempting to
establish her prima facie case she sought
to question one of the defendant-doctors as
to the propriety of the operation which he
had performed. The trial court refused to
allow such testimony and dismissed the action at the close of plaintiff's case; the appellate division affirmed holding that the
plaintiff could not compel the defendantdoctor to testify as an "expert." The Court
of Appeals, in a unanimous decision, reversed and held that a defendant-physician
in a malpractice action could be questioned
as an expert to establish the generally accepted medical practice in the community
in order to determine whether he had deviated from such a standard. McDermott
v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp.,
15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469, 255
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1964).
In order for a plaintiff to be successful
in a malpractice action, it is essential for
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-would be casual, and even rare; the mischief produced by it, constant and all ex46
tensive.
Throughout our heritage, the principle
of free exercise of religion has been a basic
tenet of the American philosophy, protecting the rights and practices of churches,
clergymen and parishioners. No practice
could be more inhibitive of this free exercise of religion than the compulsion to
testify to a confidential communication
made within the scope of religious practice.
46 Ibid.

him to establish the standard of care exercised by the doctors practicing in the defendant's locale and to prove a specific
deviation from that standard by the defendant. In the words of Judge Fuld in
the instant case:
The issue whether the defendant-doctor deviated from the proper and approved practice customarily adopted by physicians practicing in the community is assuredly "pertinent and relevant" to a malpractice action.
Indeed, absent such proof, the plaintiff's
case would have to be dismissed.1
Similarly, where the matters relevant to the
case are not within the experience and observation of the ordinary jurymen and the
facts are of such a nature as to require
special knowledge or skill, the opinion of
2
an expert is necessary.
Two facts, of which the Court of Appeals took judicial notice, should be recI McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat

Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 27, 203 N.E.2d 469, 473,
255 N.Y.S.2d 65, 71 (1964).
2 Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., 285 N.Y.
389, 396, 34 N.E.2d 367, 370 (1941). See also
Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 597 (1962).
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ognized at this point: (1) the difficulty of
securing expert testimony in a malpractice
action, and (2) the added difficulty of
doing so when the defendant is one of the
foremost authorities in his field (as in this
case) .3 Although any person--even an expert-may be subpoenaed to testify as to
his knowledge of any facts relevant to the
case, a disinterested party may not be compelled to testify concerning his expert opinion. The reasons given for this rule are
quite sound. First, a person has a property right in any expert knowledge or skill
which he possesses and he has a right not
to divulge such information although he
may voluntarily contract to do so. 4 Second,
it has been held that to allow an expert to
be compelled to testify even when he is a
disinterested party may subject him to undue harassment and constant annoyance.5
To remedy the difficulties inherent in
securing such expert testimony, the courts
of several states have construed what are
commonly referred to as "adverse-partywitness" statutes as being applicable to a
defendant when he is an expert in his particular field. 6 An adverse-party-witness
statute7 removes the common-law disability
of a party to testify as a witness.' However,
while this type of statute permits a party
to call his adversary as a witness, certain

other states have refused to allow such a
witness to be questioned as to his opinion
when he is an expert, confining the testimony to his factual knowledge of the case.9
In the jurisdictions which follow this
latter rule, the reasoning underlying such
a result has not been consistent. New Jersey merely adheres to the property right
theory stated above:' 0 The Idaho view is
that the adverse-party-witness statute was
not intended to enable the plaintiff to establish his case by the expert testimony of the
defendant, obviously implying that to do
this would be unjust and akin to self-incrimination.1" Perhaps the most cogent reason was advanced by Mr. Justice McNally
writing for the appellate division in the instant case:
In requiring the expertise of the defendant
. ..relating to usual and customary medical procedures concerning the standard by
which the jury is to judge the conduct of the
defendants, the plaintiff invites the jury to
be guided by a standard furnished by a
2
source condemned by her.'
However, the Court of Appeals, in its
lengthy McDermott opinion, rejected these
arguments. It maintained that in so holding it was doing no more than conforming to the obvious purpose underlying adverse-party-witness statutes as stated in
State v. Brainin,13 viz., "to permit the production of all pertinent and relevant evi-

3 McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat

Hosp., supra note 1, at 27, 203 N.E.2d at 474,
255 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
4Stanton v. Rushmore, 112 N.J.L. 115, 169 At.

721 (1934).
5Bucbman v. State, 59 Ind. 1, 6, 26 Am. Rep.
75 (1877).
, E.g., State v. Brainin, 224 Md. 156, 167 A.2d
117 (1961); Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal. 2d 81,
147 P.2d 604 (1944); cf., Snyder v. Pantaleo, 143
Conn. 290, 122 A.2d 21 (1956).
rSee, e.g., CPLR 4512.
s See Mauran v. Lamb, 7 Cow. 174, 178 (N.Y.

Sup. Ct. 1827).

9 Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L. 511, 516, 37 A.2d
53, 56 (1944); Forthofer v. Arnold, 60 Ohio App.
436, 441-42, 21 N.E.2d 869, 872 (1938); Hunder
v. Rindlaub, 61 N.D. 389, 406-10, 237 N.W. 915,
922 (1931); Osborn v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 168,
132 Pac. 967, 970 (1913).
10 Stanton v. Rushmore, supra note 4.

11 Osborn v. Carey, supra note 9.
12 McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat
Hosp., 16 App. Div. 2d 374, 379, 228 N.Y.S.2d
143, 148 (lst Dep't 1962).
13 Supra note 6.
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dence that is available from the parties to
the action."' 4 The Court stressed the necessity of basing its decisions on the true
facts, and that this requirement overcame
any possible detriment to be suffered by
our traditional adversary system. 1 ' In distinguishing this case, a civil action, from
one criminal in nature, it repudiated the
reasoning of the Idaho court in Osborn v.
Carey"0 and found that no inequity or injustice would result to the defendant by
allowing the plaintiff to establish her case
through the defendant's expert testimony '
The Court likewise distinguished People ex
rel. KraushaarBros. & Co. v. Thorpe 8 on
the simple ground that the witness therein
was not an interested party and on the additional ground that the basis for that decision was to prevent constant annoyance
to independent, disinterested experts, a result which would not inure in the McDermott case (where the expert is the defendant).
It appears that the Court has recognized
the difficulty which a plaintiff in a malpractice action is confronted with in securing the testimony of an expert, and that it
has sought to remedy this obvious inequity
by allowing the defendant to be compelled
to testify as an expert. Consequently, a
plaintiff is now permitted to question a de14' d. at 161, 167 A.2d at 119.
"5McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat
Hosp., supra note 1, at 28, 203 N.E.2d at 474,
255 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
I" Osborn v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 132 Pac. 967
(1913).
17 McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat
Hosp., supra note 1, at 28, 203 N.E.2d at 474,
255 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
1s 296 N.Y. 223, 72 N.E.2d 165 (1947). The appellate division relied heavily on this decision for
the proposition that a person could not be compelled to testify and give his opinion as an expert
against his will.

CATHOLIC

LAWYER, WINTER

1965

fendant-expert not only as to the facts but
also as to his opinion. However, a question
arises as to the extent to which such an
adverse party's testimony may be impeached. It is important to realize that a
party cannot ordinarily impeach his own
witness. 19 Although this rule does not apply
where the adverse party to the action is
called as a witness, 20 where one makes the
adverse party his own witness, he cannot
thereafter impeach his character for truth
and veracity, although he may dispute or

19 This rule, although criticized, is recognized as
well established in New York. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 520 (9th ed. Prince 1964). See 5
WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL

PRACTICE 4514.01 (1963) for a discussion and
criticism of the old common-law rule against
impeaching one's own witness. Note, however,
that the CPLR has modified this rule, and a
party may now impeach his own witness by
showing that he made a prior inconsistent statement, provided that it had been under oath or
in a writing subscribed by the witness. CPLR
4514.
20 Koester v. Rochester Candy Works, 194 N.Y.
92, 87 N.E. 77 (1909); Hanrahan v. New York
Edison Co., 238 N.Y. 194, 144 N.E. 499 (1924).
See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 916 (3d ed. 1940),
wherein the author states:
"If there is any situation in which any semblance of reason disappears for the application of
the rule against impeaching one's own witness, it
is when the opposing party is himself called by the
first party, and is sought to be compelled to disclose under oath that truth which he knows but
is naturally unwilling to make known."
"One peculiar practical absurdity of the opposite result may be noted. Since impeachment by
prior self-contradiction would be excluded, the
opponent would tell his story as favorably for
himself as he pleased, and no prior inconsistent
statements could be used in impeachment; so that
unless one took the risk of abiding by what the
opponent should choose to say, it would be preferable not to call him at all; thus the main purpose of the enabling statute making him compellable to testify is defeated or encumbered."
WIGMORE, op. cit. supra at § 916 n.l.
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controvert the specific facts testified to. 2 1
Whereas most defense attorneys will receive the McDermott decision with considerable apprehension, attorneys for plaintiffs will no doubt appreciate the practical
and significant benefits which will result
therefrom. By enabling the plaintiff to
elicit expert testimony from the defendant,
the Court has eliminated the necessity (and,
of course, the difficulty) of securing the
services of an independent expert.
It is also important to note that the
drafters of the CPLR have provided for
full disclosure, before trial, of all material
and necessary evidence. 2-' The decision will
therefore permit a defendant-expert to be
questioned through the use of pre-trial discovery proceedings since it stated that his
expert opinion was pertinent and relevant
to a malpractice action. This will no doubt
result in the saving of considerable timeboth to the litigants and to the court-and
Cross v. Cross, 108 N.Y. 628, 15 N.E. 333
(1888); Tryon v. Willbank, 234 App. Div. 335,
255 N.Y. Supp. 27 (4th Dep't 1932).
The California, Illinois, Maryland and federal
statutes make this clear by expressly providing
that a party may call his adversary for interrogation "as if under cross-examination." FED. R. Civ.
P. 43(b); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2055; ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, § 60 (Smith-Hurd 1955); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 35, § 9 (1957). Kansas and New Jersey are not as explicit and provide that the adverse
party may be compelled to testify in the same
manner and subject to the same rules as other
witnesses. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2803
(1949); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2:97-12 (1937). The
New York statute, on the other hand, makes no
mention of the type of testimony which may be
elicited from the adverse party-it merely enables
a party to call his adversary to testify. CPLR
4514; McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear &
Throat Hosp., supra note 1,at 26, 203 N.E.2d at
473, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
22 CPLR 3101.
21

in the settlement of many malpractice
claims out of court.
Furthermore, serious consideration must
be given to the possible application of this
case to other types of malpractice actions,
and possibly to any civil action wherein the
defendant can qualify as an expert. Despite the fact that the Court confined its
holding to a defendant-expert in a malpractice action, a sound argument can be
made for extending the rule because of the
strong reliance which the Court placed on
the Maryland court's statement of the purpose of an adverse-party-witness statute,
viz., to elicit all the pertinent facts from
82
the parties to the action. .
Thus, the decision in the instant case
represents a significant liberalization of the
strict rules pertaining to adversary proceedings which prevailed at common law.
It has a two-fold effect on the law of evidence in New York when the defendant in
a malpractice action qualifies as an expert.
First, such a party may now be questioned
concerning his expert opinion (in addition
to his factual knowledge of the case), and
second, plaintiff's counsel may impeach the
24
expert-witness' testimony.
The McDermott case may initially appear somewhat plaintiff-oriented. However,
when one considers the liberal policy pertaining to civil practice in New York, at
least as expressed in the CPLR, the holding in this case will appear to be completely in accord with such policy.

State v. Brainin, supra note 6.
It must be remembered that the defendant may
not be impeached for his truth and veracity, but
28
24

only as to the specific facts testified to. See note
21 supra.

